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Toolkit

ADDRESSING SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS

Third Edition, Available in English, French, Spanish and Chinese

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A compendium of concrete good practices to security and human rights challenges aimed at companies, security providers, civil society, national regulators and other practitioners

 


2.8. Human rights violations

a) In situations where they observe or are alerted to human rights violations by public security forces, companies may face the challenge of criticising the same institution that is providing security for their operations.

 

Good Practices*

Demonstrate a policy commitment and establish the company’s expectations regarding appropriate conduct by public security forces

  • Develop a clear statement of policy that is approved at the most senior level of the company, is informed by relevant expertise, stipulates the company’s human rights expectations of public security forces and is actively communicated to them. The statement should also be publicly available. (GPs: 16) (See Challenge 1.3.a.)
  • Explain the VPs to the public security forces.
  • Underline that individuals credibly involved in human rights abuses should not provide security for companies. (VPs: 4)
  • “Promote observance of applicable international law enforcement principles, particularly those reflected in the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms” (VPs: 4) as well as to the rules governing the conduct of hostilities under international humanitarian law in the context of armed conflict.
  • “(Refer) to expectations created by contracts or an investment agreement with the government”. (IGTs: 41)

Communicate regularly with management of public security forces at different levels

  • Hold regular meetings with the management of public security forces at different levels, including the appropriate ministry, to discuss security and human rights.
  • Build trust with public security actors. An effective way of doing this is by recognising good performance and professional conduct, (e.g. forward special commendations and letters of recognition through the chain of command to those deserving recognition). (MIGA: III-13, 14)
  • Use language carefully. Talk of “professionalisation” and emphasise the objective of helping security institutions deliver a better service. “Improved effectiveness is often a key argument for winning local support”. (OECD: 33) Appeal to values such as “operational excellence” or “best practice”. (IGTs: 41)
  • “Establish formal and consistent reporting and communications mechanisms” with public security forces. (IGTs: 14)
  • “Company security should prepare a monthly Security Status Report that summarises all significant security incidents and developments and the actions taken during the reporting period.” The on-site public security forces’ commander (if there is one), as well as the public security forces’ commanders at the local and provincial levels should all be on distribution for the report. (MIGA: III-13)
  • Collect and analyse media or NGO reports on any security incident as basis of the request for an investigation by local authorities. (MIGA: III-18)

Incorporate requirements for appropriate conduct of public security forces into an agreement/MoU at the local level (See Section 2.3. MoUs)

  • Negotiate and sign a site security agreement/MoU that establishes the “conditions, expectations, obligations and standards of behaviour outlined for all parties”, both “in standard operations procedures and in extraordinary or emergency circumstances”. “The ideal outcome is a binding agreement that specifies the responsibilities and obligations of the company and the public security forces, signed by the senior leadership of the company and the respective agencies with detailed implementation instructions at subordinate levels.” (MIGA: III-3, 6)
  • Use any in-kind support the company provides to agree clear rules on deployment and conduct of public security forces. (MIGA: III-7)
  • Include a clause that establishes a procedure to follow in case of human rights and international humanitarian law violations.
  • Ensure the agreement is consistent with host nation laws and relevant regulations.
  • Invest time in negotiations to ensure the VPs are well integrated into the MoU.

Engage with other stakeholders

  • Use influence with government officials to ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law by public security forces.
  • Seek home government support to gain access to high-level public security officials. (see Example 2 in IGTs: 77)
  • Consult regularly with other companies having common concerns and consider collectively raising those concerns with the host and home governments. (VPs: 4)
  • Engage with NGOs as “valuable interlocutors or mediators in terms of communicating with security providers, governments or host communities.” (IGTs: 18)
  • Seek information on human rights violations through community-level grievance mechanisms.
  • “Consider establishing a multi-stakeholder security forum” (IGTs: 44) to discuss security and human rights issues. The group should meet regularly (e.g. monthly) and work together to find appropriate solutions to security incidents or challenges. Its membership should include at least “a representative from the company (usually the security manager), the police chief, the military commander, the local head of government and one or two local leaders”. (MIGA: V-8) (See Lubumbashi case study) Ensure that the local population, in particular the most vulnerable groups (e.g. women and indigenous peoples), is adequately represented in the forum.

Demonstrate efforts to put an end to human rights violations by public security forces assigned to the company’s area of operations

  • Demonstrate ongoing efforts to mitigate the impact of violations. (GPs: 22)
  • In cases of severe violations, if possible, end the relationship with public security forces. If it is not possible to put an end to the relationship, minimise the presence of public security forces at company sites.

Support security sector reform programmes

  • Engage with security sector reform programmes that “support selection and recruitment policy that is based on proper recruitment mechanisms, integrity assessments, and vetting or other forms of review/screening of existing personnel. Support public announcements for vacancies/openings and transparency throughout the process.” (ITGNs: 105)
  • If legally allowed, support programmes that promote “vetting based on human rights standards and review of human rights records for all individuals, to ensure that those personally responsible for gross human rights violations are excluded from the reformed security sector; ensure that the removal of persons as a consequence of vetting complies with due process of law and the principle of non-discrimination.” (ITGNs: 106)
b) Raising awareness on human rights policies may be more challenging with the armed forces than the police.

 

Good Practices*

Communicate regularly with different levels within the armed forces

  • Establish a working relationship with military forces representatives at different levels and hold regular meetings to discuss security and human rights. (MIGA: III-14)
  • Develop institutional relationships with the ministry of defence.
  • Build trust with the armed forces. An effective way of doing this is by recognising good performance and professional conduct among personnel assigned to company operations (e.g. forward special commendations and letters of recognition through the chain of command to those deserving recognition). (MIGA: III-13, 14)
  • Use language carefully. Talk of “professionalisation” and emphasise the objective of helping security institutions deliver a better service. “Improved effectiveness is often a key argument for winning local support”. (OECD: 33) Appeal to values such as “operational excellence” or “best practice”. (IGTs: 41)
  • “Establish formal and consistent reporting and communications mechanisms” with the armed forces. (IGTs: 14)
  • “Company security should prepare a monthly Security Status Report that summarises all significant security incidents and developments and the actions taken during the reporting period.” The on-site army commander (if there is one), as well as the commanders at the local and provincial levels should all be on distribution for the report. (MIGA: III-13)

Support efforts to clearly delimitate the roles of public security forces

  • Ensure that company practices support efforts to define the specific roles of the police, paramilitary forces and the military and to provide adequate oversight in order to avoid blurred lines of responsibility. “In principle, the police should have the primary responsibility for internal security.” However, if police and paramilitary forces are not competent or sufficiently equipped, the deployment of the army may be necessary. (OECD: 124) If that is the case, seek to ensure personnel deployed are properly trained and equipped for the task.

Support human rights and international humanitarian law training programmes for public security forces (See Section 2.5. Training)

  • Include a clause in the agreement with public security requiring that all public security forces assigned to the company’s site undergo human rights and international humanitarian law training. (IGTs: 45)
  • Support training programmes for trainers of public security forces. If possible, insist that army trainers are military and police trainers are policemen, since they are better placed to communicate the content of training in a way that trainees can relate to. Furthermore, public security forces are much more likely to take the training seriously if it is a colleague or someone on their chain of command delivering the training.
c) Public security forces may themselves suffer human rights abuses, which may affect the quality of security service provision.

 

Good Practices*

Assess the risk of human rights violations of public security forces

  • Consider any relevant past incidents where the rights of public security forces were violated.
  • Consult host and home government representatives, civil society, and other sources in order to gather information about the severity of this risk.
  • Assess the different risks faced by men and women in public security forces, considering in particular the risk of gender-based violence.

Engage with national and local authorities

  • Engage with relevant interlocutors at each level of public security forces command, including the relevant ministry. Meet with the regional and local public security forces representative on a regular basis (preferably not less than quarterly). (MIGA: III-11) Raise this challenge as part of the discussion on security and human rights.
  • Seek home government support to have access to high-level public security officials in order to discuss this problem.
  • Ensure that salaries/stipends are paid to public security forces assigned to areas of company’s operations.

“Work with NGOs to address human rights abuse allegations” (IGTs: 18)

  • Identify NGOs that may be working on related issues. “There may be a number of NGOs in the country with whom the company can work.” (IGTs: 17) This may be a sensitive issue, so the company will need to carefully assess which is the best approach.
  • In case of credible evidence of gender-based violence directed at members of public security forces, consult a local organisation with gender expertise to identify potential mitigation strategies.

Support security sector reform programmes

  • Engage with security sector reform programmes that “support selection and recruitment policy that is based on proper recruitment mechanisms, integrity assessments, and vetting or other forms of review/screening of existing personnel. Support public announcement for vacancies/openings and transparency throughout the process.” (ITGNs: 105)
  • Support security sector reform programmes that seek to strengthen capacities of relevant national institutions (such as ombudsperson or similar mechanisms) to address this challenge.

Establish an operational-level grievance mechanism that allows individuals to report any abuses anonymously (GPs: 31)

d) Companies may not adequately monitor the behaviour of public security forces and/or press for proper resolution of human rights violations.

 

Good Practices*

Carry out human rights due diligence in order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how the company addresses its adverse human rights impacts

  • Assess actual and potential human rights impacts of company presence and activities, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed. Ensure impacts on vulnerable groups, such as children, older persons, indigenous peoples and women, are assessed as well.
  • Human rights due diligence:
    a) Should cover adverse human rights impacts that the company may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be “directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts”. A company’s “‘activities’ are understood to include both actions and omissions.” (GPs: 13-14) Where possible, assess the human rights context prior to a proposed business activity.
    b) “Will vary in complexity with the size of the enterprise, the risk of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context of its operations”. (GPs: 17)
    c) “Should be ongoing, recognising that the human rights risks may change over time as the business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve.” (GPs: 17)
  • Assess local capacity to investigate abuses and provide for proper resolution. Risk assessments should “consider the local prosecuting authority and judiciary’s capacity to hold accountable those responsible for human rights abuses and for those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law in a manner that respects the rights of the accused.” (VPs: 5)

Engage with national, regional and local authorities

  • Hold bilateral meetings with host government representatives. Keeping these discussions confidential may make company efforts more effective. (MIGA: VI-5)
  • Use leverage to reduce adverse human rights impacts as a result of business relationships. “Leverage may be increased by, for example, offering capacity-building or other incentives to the related entity, or collaborating with other actors.” (GPs: 22)

Consult with potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders

  • Include meaningful discussions on security and human rights in community consultations “in a manner that takes into account language and other potential barriers to effective engagement”. (GPs: 20) These consultations should include men and women of different ethnicities and age groups.
  • Encourage host governments and public security forces to send a representative to community consultations. (IGTs: 41)

Engage in pro-active monitoring rather than just responding to complaints

  • Establish a company policy on what employees should do in case of an alleged human rights violation by public security forces.
  • Include the establishment of a monitoring system in a MoU. (IGTs: 45)
  • Record all allegations. Use a confidential and reliable tracking system assessment and reporting tool to monitor human rights violations. (MIGA: II-9)
  • Ensure evidence is reliable. “Every effort should be made to ensure that information used as the basis for allegations of human rights (and international humanitarian law) abuses is credible and based on reliable evidence.” (VPs: 5)
  • “Consider the formulation of an external stakeholder advisory panel to help monitor security and human rights issues.”
    • “Include stakeholders with legitimacy in the eyes of public security providers”. (IGTs: 47)
    • Ensure the local population participates in monitoring mechanisms. It is particularly important that the needs of most vulnerable groups, including women and indigenous people, are adequately represented in the panel.

Establish an operational-level grievance mechanism that allows individuals to report any abuse anonymously (GPs: 31)

  • Establish at least one of the following mechanisms (MIGA: III-16):
    • A report abuse hotline,
    • A system to receive SMS,
    • “A computer address in the company offices that is solely accessible by a trusted monitor and a secure mailing address”,
    • ‘Tip boxes’ located in areas where individuals have “unobserved access to the boxes and can drop in anonymous notes, tips or other information”, with clear instructions posted above them.
  • “Grievance mechanisms need not be VPs-specific. VPs related issues should be integrated into any existing community grievance mechanisms.” (IGTs: 19)
  • Ensure the grievance mechanism “does not have to wait until an issue amounts to an alleged human rights abuse or a breach of other standards before it can address it”. (UNIG: 68)
  • “Where businesses are aware of alleged violations within their area of operations, whether or not a grievance is raised, record the allegation and any actions taken.”[15]
  • Grievance mechanisms should be culturally appropriate and ensure grievances are handled in a way that is accepted by the community.
  • Make the grievance mechanism “known to, and trusted by, those stakeholders for whom it is intended”. (UNIG: 65)

Where force was used, ensure that medical attention is provided to injured parties (VPs: 4)

Report abuses

  • Educate company staff about “the obligation to report allegations so that appropriate inquires can take place”. (MIGA: III-16) “The company has a greater ability to influence its own workforce than it has with the other security stakeholders.” (MIGA: V-6) (For an Incident Report Template see IGTs: 95)
  • Report any credible and verified allegations of human rights and international humanitarian law abuses by public security in their areas of operation to appropriate host government authorities. (VPs: 5) Request for investigation “to the lowest level that has the authority to conduct an incident investigation as long as that level is not itself implicated in the incident.” (MIGA: III-18-19)
  • Ensure the public prosecutor’s office, or equivalent entity, is informed.
  • Ensure legal and physical protection of those making the allegations and victim(s). (IGTs: 46)

Request that the alleged perpetrator(s) is/are withdrawn from the site until an official investigation is concluded

Actively follow-up the status of investigations and press for proper resolution (VPs: 5)

  • Conduct a full-scale internal investigation “if the alleged incident occurred on company property, if it involved company equipment, or if it occurred because of company activities or operations”. “A similar inquiry is appropriate for allegations that occur in the company’s areas of operations.” (MIGA: III-17-18)
  • Where appropriate, urge that investigation and action be taken to prevent any recurrence. Companies should “do as much as possible to ensure that the host government investigates any human rights abuse allegations, protects victim(s) and resolves the situation according to the rule of law.” (IGTs: 15)

Involve other stakeholders in the follow-up of investigations

  • Share information about security incidents.
  • Inform the national ombudsman or human rights agency with the responsibility for investigating human rights allegations, so that they “encourage the appropriate authorities to perform a proper investigation and take disciplinary legal action where justified”. (MIGA: III-19)
  • “Support the capacity of civil society organisations to actively monitor security policies and practices affecting their constituents and to advocate appropriate solutions.” (ITGNs: 98)
  • Engage with home country governments and international organisations. They “can serve as important interlocutors between the company and the host government during instances of human rights (and international humanitarian law) abuse allegations.” (IGTs: 16) This is also a good way to safeguard good relationships with authorities and avoid the perception of undue influence.
  • “Where an incident triggers significant concern from external stakeholders, consider commissioning an external investigation.”[16]

Provide for or cooperate in the remediation of adverse impacts the company has caused or contributed to through legitimate processes (GPs: 24)

Track effectiveness of response on the basis of “appropriate qualitative and quantitative indicators” and drawing on “feedback from both internal and external sources, including affected stakeholders”. (GPs: 22)

“Conduct lessons learned exercises internally and with all appropriate stakeholders” (IGTs: 46)

  • Wherever a significant human rights impact has occurred, initiate a process to identify how and why it occurred. This is important to prevent or mitigate its continuation or recurrence. “If the evidence is sufficiently clear, linking this kind of analysis to staff incentives and disincentives, whether financial compensation, promotion or other rewards, can play an important role in helping to embed respect for human rights into the practices of the enterprise.” (UNIG: 54)
  • “Work with public security providers, as applicable, to apply lessons learned.” (IGTs: 46)

* These good practices are not meant to be prescriptive. It is up to the user to evaluate whether they could be feasible, useful and appropriate to the local context in a specific situation on the ground.

1. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights: Performance Indicators (International Alert), p.15.

2. “The title and format of this agreement depends on the requirements of the parties. It may be a Joint Protocol, Memorandum of Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding or Letter. The content is more important.” (MIGA: III-3)

3. Except where otherwise indicated these bullet points have been extracted from IGTs: 45.

4. This case study has been written by DCAF in collaboration with TFM.

5. “Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions in Security Sector Reform”, Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, Tool 13 (DCAF, OSCE/ ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW), p.12

6. Colombia’s Mining and Energy Committee Recommendation to support the defence sector in the implementation of the comprehensive human rights and international humanitarian law policy of the ministry of defence: http://cmecolombia.co/recomendaciones-para-apoyar-al-sector-defensa-en-la-implementacionde-la-politica-integral-de-derechos-humanos-y-derecho-internacional-humanitario-del-ministerio-de-defensa/

7. This case study has been written by DCAF in collaboration with TFM.

8. The full case study has been developed by BP and Safestainable and it is available at: http://www.securityhumanrightshub.org/sites/default/files/publications/ Case_Study_Iraq_Engagement_With_Public_Security.pdf

9. This case study has been developed jointly by the FFP, Kosmos and DCAF. It is also available at: http://www.securityhumanrightshub.org/sites/default/files/ publications/Case_Study_Cameroon_Human_Rights_Training.pdf

10. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights – Implementation Guideline (BP), p. 13

11. Ibid, p. 13

12. Ibid, p. 13

13. Ibid, p. 13

14. This refers to law enforcement operations. In situations of armed conflict international humanitarian law applies, which establishes different rules on the use of force.

15. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights – Implementation Guideline (BP), p. 15

16. Ibid, p.15.